The generality of belief in unsubstantiated claims

@article{Bensley2019TheGO,
  title={The generality of belief in unsubstantiated claims},
  author={D. Alan Bensley and Scott O. Lilienfeld and Krystal A. Rowan and Christopher M. Masciocchi and Florent Grain},
  journal={Applied Cognitive Psychology},
  year={2019}
}
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