The function of phenomenal states: supramodular interaction theory.

  title={The function of phenomenal states: supramodular interaction theory.},
  author={Ezequiel Morsella},
  journal={Psychological review},
  volume={112 4},
Discovering the function of phenomenal states remains a formidable scientific challenge. Research on consciously penetrable conflicts (e.g., "pain-for-gain" scenarios) and impenetrable conflicts (as in the pupillary reflex, ventriloquism, and the McGurk effect [H. McGurk & J. MacDonald, 1976]) reveals that these states integrate diverse kinds of information to yield adaptive action. Supramodular interaction theory proposes that phenomenal states play an essential role in permitting interactions… 

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