The fragmented folk : More evidence of stable individual differences in moral judgments and folk intuitions
@inproceedings{Feltz2008TheFF, title={The fragmented folk : More evidence of stable individual differences in moral judgments and folk intuitions}, author={Adam Feltz and Edward T. Cokely}, year={2008} }
In a series of five experiments, we demonstrate that moral judgments and folk intuitions are often predictably fragmented. Drawing on the domains of ethics and action theory, we illustrate ways in which judgment tends to be associated with stable individual differences such as personality traits and reflective cognitive styles. We argue that these individual differences pose several unique challenges as well as provide opportunities for further theoretical development in the emerging field of…
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