The fragility of information aggregation in large elections

@article{Mandler2012TheFO,
  title={The fragility of information aggregation in large elections},
  author={Michael Mandler},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={2012},
  volume={74},
  pages={257-268}
}
Article history: Received 3 September 2009 Available online xxxx JEL classification: C72 D72 
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