The folk on knowing how

  title={The folk on knowing how},
  author={John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett and Jennifer Cole Wright},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
It has been claimed that the attempt to analyze know-how in terms of propositional knowledge over-intellectualizes the mind. Exploiting the methods of so-called “experimental philosophy”, we show that the charge of over-intellectualization is baseless. Contra neo-Ryleans, who analyze know-how in terms of ability, the concrete-case judgments of ordinary folk are most consistent with the view that there exists a set of correct necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how that does not invoke… 
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