• Corpus ID: 15815990

The fate of presentism in modern physics

@article{Wuthrich2012TheFO,
  title={The fate of presentism in modern physics},
  author={Christian Wuthrich},
  journal={arXiv: History and Philosophy of Physics},
  year={2012}
}
  • C. Wuthrich
  • Published 5 July 2012
  • Philosophy
  • arXiv: History and Philosophy of Physics
There has been a recent spate of essays defending presentism, the view in the metaphysics of time according to which all and only present events or entities exist. What is particularly striking about this resurgence is that it takes place on the background of the significant pressure exerted on the position by the relativity of simultaneity asserted in special relativity, and yet in several cases invokes modern physics for support. I classify the presentist replies to this pressure into a two… 

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