The evolution of punishing institutions

@article{Salahshour2020TheEO,
  title={The evolution of punishing institutions},
  author={Mohammad Ali Salahshour},
  journal={arXiv: Physics and Society},
  year={2020}
}
  • M. Salahshour
  • Published 25 October 2020
  • Economics
  • arXiv: Physics and Society
A large body of empirical evidence suggests that humans are willing to engage in costly punishment of defectors in public goods games. Based on such pieces of evidence, it is suggested that punishment serves an important role in promoting cooperation in humans, and possibly other species. Nevertheless, theoretical work has been unable to show how this is possible. The problem originates from the fact that punishment, being costly, is an altruistic act and its evolution is subject to the same… 
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