The evolution of fairness through spite

  title={The evolution of fairness through spite},
  author={Patrick Forber and Rory Smead},
  journal={Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences},
The presence of apparently irrational fair play in the ultimatum game remains a focal point for studies in the evolution of social behaviour. We investigate the role of negative assortment in the evolution of fair play in the ultimatum game. Spite—social behaviour that inflicts harm with no direct benefit to the actor—can evolve when it is disproportionally directed at individuals playing different strategies. The introduction of negative assortment alters the dynamics in a way that increases… 

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