The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion

  title={The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion},
  author={Tatsuya Sasaki and Satoshi Uchida},
  journal={Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences},
The exclusion of freeriders from common privileges or public acceptance is widely found in the real world. Current models on the evolution of cooperation with incentives mostly assume peer sanctioning, whereby a punisher imposes penalties on freeriders at a cost to itself. It is well known that such costly punishment has two substantial difficulties. First, a rare punishing cooperator barely subverts the asocial society of freeriders, and second, natural selection often eliminates punishing… 

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