The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core

@article{Llerena2015TheEC,
  title={The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core},
  author={Francesc Llerena and Cori Vilella},
  journal={Mathematical Methods of Operations Research},
  year={2015},
  volume={81},
  pages={235-244}
}
In this note, we give a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. As a consequence, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten in Decision theory and social ethics: issues in social choice, Reidel, Dordrecht, 289–301,  1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta and Ray in Games Econ Behav 3:403–422, 1991). 
1 Citations

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In this paper we study the equity core (Selten, 1978) and compare it with the core. A payoff vector is in the equity core if no coalition can divide its value among its members proportionally to a

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