The epistemic significance of political disagreement
@article{Hallsson2019TheES, title={The epistemic significance of political disagreement}, author={Bj{\o}rn G. Hallsson}, journal={Philosophical Studies}, year={2019}, volume={176}, pages={2187-2202} }
The degree of doxastic revision required in response to evidence of disagreement is typically thought to be a function of our beliefs about (1) our interlocutor’s familiarity with the relevant evidence and arguments, and their intellectual capacities and virtues, relative to our own, or (2) the expected probability of our interlocutor being correct, conditional on our disagreeing. While these two factors are typically used interchangeably, I show that they have an inverse correlation in cases… Expand
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