The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience

  title={The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience},
  author={Susanna Siegel},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  • S. Siegel
  • Published 1 February 2013
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical Studies
forthcoming in Philosophical Studies as a symposium Down in the basement of the mind, unconscious processes unfold that give rise to conscious experience. In this paper I argue that those processes can impact the rational role of experience. Suppose you want to know whether there's any mustard in the fridge. You open the door to look. There's the mustard, in a half-­‐empty jar, sitting in the fridge door. So far, looking in the fridge has given you excellent reason to believe that there's… 

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