The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
@article{Haidt2001TheED, title={The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.}, author={Jonathan Haidt}, journal={Psychological review}, year={2001}, volume={108 4}, pages={ 814-34 } }
Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private…
6,376 Citations
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