The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

  title={The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.},
  author={Jonathan Haidt},
  journal={Psychological review},
  volume={108 4},
  • J. Haidt
  • Published 1 October 2001
  • Psychology
  • Psychological review
Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private… 

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