The effects of the take-option in dictator-game experiments: a comment on Engel’s (2011) meta-study

@article{Zhang2014TheEO,
  title={The effects of the take-option in dictator-game experiments: a comment on Engel’s (2011) meta-study},
  author={Le Zhang and Andreas Ortmann},
  journal={Experimental Economics},
  year={2014},
  volume={17},
  pages={414-420}
}
In this paper, we report a replication of Engel’s (Exp. Econ. 14(4):583–610, 2011) meta-study of dictator game experiments. We find Engel’s meta-study of dictator game experiments to be robust, with one important exception: the coding of the take-option (List in J. Polit. Econ. 115(3):482–493, 2007; Bardsley in Exp. Econ. 11(2):122–133, 2008; Cappelen et al. in Econ. Lett. 118(2):280–283, 2013). While Engel reports this as having no statistically significant effect, in our replications, we find… 
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