The effect of organizational form on quality: the case of franchising

  title={The effect of organizational form on quality: the case of franchising},
  author={Steven C. Michael},
  journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
  • Steven C. Michael
  • Published 14 January 2000
  • Business
  • Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

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