Corpus ID: 55593910

The effect of executive compensation dispersion and risk avoidance on firm performance

  title={The effect of executive compensation dispersion and risk avoidance on firm performance},
  author={C.J.E. Verbaarendse},
This study examines the relationship between CEO Pay Slice (CPS) – the fraction of total compensation of the top five executives that is captured by the CEO – and firm performance and the relationship between risk avoidance and firm performance as well. Further, this research studies whether the financial crisis has an effect on CPS or risk avoidance. This research used U.S. listed firms only and the sample is drawn from the years 1997-2012. There was a negative relation found between crisis… Expand


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