The effect of collusion in congestion games

@inproceedings{Hayrapetyan2006TheEO,
  title={The effect of collusion in congestion games},
  author={Ara Hayrapetyan and {\'E}va Tardos and Tom Wexler},
  booktitle={STOC},
  year={2006}
}
In this paper we initiate the study of how collusion alters the quality of solutions obtained in competitive games. The price of anarchy aims to measure the cost of the lack of coordination by comparing the quality of a Nash equilibrium to that of a centrally designed optimal solution. This notion assumes that players act not only selfishly, but also independently. We propose a framework for modeling groups of colluding players, in which members of a coalition cooperate so as to selfishly… CONTINUE READING
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