The effect of a looker's past reliability on infants' reasoning about beliefs.

@article{PoulinDubois2009TheEO,
  title={The effect of a looker's past reliability on infants' reasoning about beliefs.},
  author={Diane Poulin-Dubois and Virginia Chow},
  journal={Developmental psychology},
  year={2009},
  volume={45 6},
  pages={
          1576-82
        }
}
We investigated whether 16-month-old infants' past experience with a person's gaze reliability influences their expectation about the person's ability to form beliefs. Infants were first administered a search task in which they observed an experimenter show excitement while looking inside a box that either contained a toy (reliable looker condition) or was empty (unreliable looker condition). The infants were then administered a true belief task in which they watched as the same experimenter… 

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