The dynamics of public investment under persistent electoral advantage ∗

@inproceedings{Azzimonti2011TheDO,
  title={The dynamics of public investment under persistent electoral advantage ∗},
  author={Marina Azzimonti},
  year={2011}
}
This paper studies the effects of asymmetries in re-election probabilities across parties on public policy and their subsequent propagation to the economy. The struggle between groups that disagree on targeted public spending (e.g., pork) results in governments being endogenously short-sighted: Systematic underinvestment in infrastructure and overspending on targeted goods arise, above and beyond what is observed in symmetric environments. Because the party enjoying an electoral advantage is… CONTINUE READING

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