The disunity of consciousness

  title={The disunity of consciousness},
  author={Semir Zeki},
  journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
  • S. Zeki
  • Published 1 May 2003
  • Philosophy, Biology
  • Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Physical integration: a causal account for consciousness.

In this paper, integration as an effective level of physical organization is contrasted with a methodological integrative approach and a causal account of physical integration for consciousness centered on joint causation is outlined.

Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity

This paper proposes a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality, and compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection.

Consciousness as the Temporal Propagation of Information

Our ability to understand the mind and its relation to the body is highly dependent on the way we define consciousness and the lens through which we study it. We argue that looking at conscious

From the origins to the stream of consciousness and its neural correlates

There are now dozens of very different theories of consciousness, each somehow contributing to our understanding of its nature. The science of consciousness needs therefore not new theories but a

Brain Structures and Consciousness

This chapter introduces the problem of localization of mental functions within the brain, and suggests that the neural binding cannot be simply explained paradigm suggesting localization of the mental functions, thus necessitating substantial revision of the Cartesian concept of the brain and localization of consciousness.

Why and how access consciousness can account for phenomenal consciousness

  • L. Naccache
  • Psychology, Philosophy
    Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
  • 2018
It is shown how a strict A-Cs theory can account for the authors' conscious experience, and a set of testable predictions, of unsolved questions and of some counterintuitive hypotheses are listed.

Consciousness, schizophrenia and complexity

  • P. Bob
  • Psychology
    Cognitive Systems Research
  • 2012


The question about the potential for consciousness of artificial systems has often been addressed using thought experiments, which are often problematic in the philosophy of mind. A more promising

Underwhelming force: Evaluating the neuropsychological evidence for higher‐order theories of consciousness

Proponents of the higher-order (HO) theory of consciousness (e.g., Lau and Rosenthal) have recently appealed to brain lesion evidence to support their thesis that mental states are conscious when and

Does brain activity cause consciousness? A thought experiment

A thought experiment is discussed in which neural activity, in the form of action potentials, is initially recorded from all the neurons in a participant’s brain during a conscious experience and then played back into the same neurons, to consider whether this artificial replay can reconstitute aconscious experience.



Visual perception and phenomenal consciousness

Consciousness and the Binding Problem

  • W. Singer
  • Biology
    Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
  • 2001
It is concluded that phenomenal awareness is amenable to neurobiological reductionism; but it is also proposed that self‐consciousness requires a different explanatory approach because it emerges from the dialogue between different brains and hence has the quality of a cultural construct.

The asynchrony of consciousness

  • S. ZekiA. Bartels
  • Psychology, Biology
    Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences
  • 1998
A simple hypothesis is presented that when two attributes are presented simultaneously, the activity of cells in a given processing system is sufficient to create a conscious experience of the corresponding attribute, reflecting the modular organization of the visual brain.

Conscious Behavior Explained

  • M. Kurthen
  • Psychology, Philosophy
    Consciousness and Cognition
  • 1999
It is argued that research on temporal binding plays no role in a naturalistic theory of consciousness if the gap argument can be solved on internal philosophical grounds or if it turns out to be unsolvable at the time being.

Neural correlates of consciousness in humans

Functional neuroimaging in humans and electrophysiology in awake mokeys indicate that there are important differences between striate and extrastriate visual cortex in how well neural activity correlates with consciousness.

Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness

The neural basis of very short-term memory especia needs more study, and several lines of work are outfits that might advance the understanding of the neural mechanisms involved.

Temporal Binding, Binocular Rivalry, and Consciousness

The hypothesis is that synchronization of neuronal discharges can serve for the integration of distributed neurons into cell assemblies and that this process may underlie the selection of perceptually and behaviorally relevant information.

Toward a Theory of Visual Consciousness

It is proposed that each node of a processing-perceptual system creates its own microconsciousness, and that, if any binding occurs to give us the authors' integrated image of the visual world, it must be a binding between microconsciousnesses generated at different nodes.

The Riddoch syndrome: insights into the neurobiology of conscious vision.

It is concluded that agnosopsia, gnosopsia and gnosanopsia are all manifestations of a single condition which the Riddoch syndrome, in deference to the British neurologist who, in 1917, first characterized the major aspect of this disability.