The determinacy of infinite games with eventual perfect monitoring

  title={The determinacy of infinite games with eventual perfect monitoring},
  author={Eran Shmaya},
An infinite two-player zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the opponent’s actions are monitored eventually but not necessarily immediately after they are played, admits a value. The proof relies on a representation of the game as a stochastic game with perfect information, in which Nature operates as a delegate for the players and performs the randomizations for them. 
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Stochastic games with information lag
  • Y. Levy
  • Economics
    Games Econ. Behav.
  • 2012
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