The deliberative stit: A study of action, omission, ability, and obligation

@article{Horty1995TheDS,
  title={The deliberative stit: A study of action, omission, ability, and obligation},
  author={John F. Horty and Nuel Belnap},
  journal={Journal of Philosophical Logic},
  year={1995},
  volume={24},
  pages={583-644}
}
  • J. Horty, N. Belnap
  • Published 1 December 1995
  • Philosophy, Computer Science
  • Journal of Philosophical Logic
L'A. propose une alternative a la stit theory (selon laquelle l'agent sees to it that A) developpee par N. Belnap et M. Perloff en terme de logique de l'accomplissement. L'A. privilegie l'operateur modal de l'action elabore par F. von Kutschera et J. F. Horty dans le sens d'un stit deliberatif qui peut s'appliquer a la logique deontique 
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