The critique of pure phenomenology

  title={The critique of pure phenomenology},
  author={Alva No{\"e}},
  journal={Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
  • A. Noë
  • Published 10 January 2007
  • Philosophy, Psychology
  • Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
The topic of this paper is phenomenology. How should we think of phenomenology – the discipline or activity of investigating experience itself – if phenomenology is to be a genuine source of knowledge? This is related to the question whether phenomenology can make a contribution to the empirical study of human or animal experience. My own view is that it can. But only if we make a fresh start in understanding what phenomenology is and can be. 
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