The cost of thinking about false beliefs: Evidence from adults’ performance on a non-inferential theory of mind task

@article{Apperly2008TheCO,
  title={The cost of thinking about false beliefs: Evidence from adults’ performance on a non-inferential theory of mind task},
  author={Ian A. Apperly and Elisa Back and Dana Samson and Lisa France},
  journal={Cognition},
  year={2008},
  volume={106},
  pages={1093-1108}
}
Much of what we know about other people's beliefs comes non-inferentially from what people tell us. Developmental research suggests that 3-year-olds have difficulty processing such information: they suffer interference from their own knowledge of reality when told about someone's false belief (e.g., [Wellman, H. M., & Bartsch, K. (1988). Young children's reasoning about beliefs. Cognition, 30, 239-277.]). The current studies examined for the first time whether similar interference occurs in… CONTINUE READING

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