The control of politicians: An economic model

  title={The control of politicians: An economic model},
  author={R. Barro},
  journal={Public Choice},
  • R. Barro
  • Published 1973
  • Economics
  • Public Choice
This paper applies economic theory to an analysis of behavior in the public sector. The model focuses on the division of interest between the public and its political representatives. The division of interest arises because the public officeholder is assumed to act to advance his own interests, and these interests do not coincide automatically with those of his constituents. The electoral process and some elements of the political structure are then analyzed as mechanisms which can be used to… Expand
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  • Economics
  • Journal of Political Economy
  • 1977
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This paper analyzes the effects of asymmetric information on the public control of politicians in a world where the politicians’ pre-election promises are not credible. We study a model withExpand


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  • Economics
  • The Journal of Law and Economics
  • 1970
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  • 1972
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