The continuous prisoner's dilemma and the evolution of cooperation through reciprocal altruism with variable investment.

@article{Killingback2002TheCP,
  title={The continuous prisoner's dilemma and the evolution of cooperation through reciprocal altruism with variable investment.},
  author={Timothy P Killingback and Michael Doebeli},
  journal={The American naturalist},
  year={2002},
  volume={160 4},
  pages={421-38}
}
Understanding the evolutionary origin and persistence of cooperative behavior is a fundamental biological problem. The standard "prisoner's dilemma," which is the most widely adopted framework for studying the evolution of cooperation through reciprocal altruism between unrelated individuals, does not allow for varying degrees of cooperation. Here we study the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma, in which cooperative investments can vary continuously in each round. This game has been… CONTINUE READING

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