The complexity of welfare maximization in congestion games

  title={The complexity of welfare maximization in congestion games},
  author={Carol A. Meyers and Andreas S. Schulz},
We investigate issues of complexity related to welfare maximization in congestion games. In particular, we provide a full classification of complexity results for the problem of finding a minimum cost solution to a congestion game, under the model of Rosenthal. We consider both network and general congestion games, and we examine several variants of the problem concerning the structure of the game and the properties of its associated cost functions. Many of these problem variants turn out to be… CONTINUE READING

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