The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates

@article{Faliszewski2011TheCO,
  title={The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates},
  author={Piotr Faliszewski and Edith Hemaspaandra and Lane A. Hemaspaandra},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2011},
  volume={abs/1105.5032}
}
Many electoral bribery, control, and manipulation problems (which we will refer to in general as "manipulative actions" problems) are NP-hard in the general case. It has recently been noted that many of these problems fall into polynomial time if the electorate is single-peaked (i.e., is polarized along some axis/issue). However, real-world electorates are not truly single-peaked. There are usually some mavericks, and so real-world electorates tend to merely be nearly single-peaked. This paper… 
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93 Citations

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Bypassing Combinatorial Protections: Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Single-Peaked Electorates

For voters who follow the most central political-science model of electorates — single-peaked preferences — those protections vanish, and it is shown that NP-hard bribery problems — including those for Kemeny and Llull elections- — fall to polynomial time.

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Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey

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