• DOI:10.1515/cogl.1995.6.4.347
• Corpus ID: 144424435

The cognitive psychological reality of image schemas and their transformations

@inproceedings{Gibbs1995TheCP,
  title={The cognitive psychological reality of image schemas and their transformations},
  author={Raymond W. Gibbs and Herbert L. Colston},
  year={1995}
}

• R. Gibbs, Herbert L. Colston
• Published 1995
• Psychology

One of the important theoretical ideas in cognitive semantics is t hat image Schemas and their transformations provide pari of the foundation for ihought, reasoning, and Imagination. Image Schemas are different patterns of recurring bodily experiences that emerge throughout sensorimotor activity andfrom our perceptual understanding ofactions andevents in the world. Our aim in this paper is to discuss some of the empirical evidence from psycholinguistics, cognitive psychology, and developmental psychology that is consistent with the idea that image Schemas and their transformations play important roles in human cognition. This experimental research was not conducted and has not generally been considered in terms ofthe cognitive linguistic ideas on image Schemas. However, a large body of research can be interpreted äs supporting the claim that image Schemas are indeed psychologically real andfunction in many aspects of how people process linguistic and nonlinguistic Information. Our review suggests possible ways of integrating this research with thefindings on linguistic structure and meaning in cognitive semantics. One of the important Claims of cognitive semantics is that much of our knowledge is not static, propositional and sentential, but is grounded in and structured by various patterns of our perceptual interactions, bodily actions, and manipulations of objects (Johnson 1987, 1993; Lakoff 1987, 1990; Talmy 1988). These patterns are experiential gestalts, called image Schemas, that emerge throughout sensorimotor activity äs we manipulate objects, Orient ourselves spatially and temporally, and direct our perceptual focus for various purposes (Johnson 1991). Studies in cognitive linguistics suggest that over two dozen different image Schemas and several image Schema transformations appear regularly in people's everyday thinking, reasoning, and Imagination (Johnson Cognitive Linguistics 6-4 (1995), 347-378 0936-5907/95/0006-0347 © Walter de Gruyter 348 R. W. Gibbs, Jr. and H. L. Colston 1987; Lakoff 1987). Among these are the schematic structures of CONTAINER, BALANCE, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, PATH, CYCLE, ATTRACTION, CENTER-PERIPHERY, and LINK. These image Schemas cover a wide ränge of experiential structures that are pervasive in experience, have internal structure, and can be metaphorically elaborated to provide for our understanding of more abstract domains. For example, cognitive linguistic research has examined how image Schemas are used to create grammatical forms (Langacker 1987, 1991), to represent the underlying meaning that relates the seemingly disparate senses of prepositions (Brugman and Lakoff 1988; Vandeloise 1993), to motivate verb-particle constructions, such äs those focusing on up and out (Lindner 1983), adverbs, such äs very (Brugman 1984), certain verbs, such äs take (Norvig and Lakoff 1987), äs well äs to explain the many kinds of cognitive relationships that can form the basis of the extension of a category such äs Japanese hon (Lakoff 1987). More recent investigations from linguistics and philosophy examined the role that image Schemas have in motivating abstract metaphorical concepts, such äs causation, death, and morality (Johnson 1993; Lakoff 1990; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Turner 1991). Although these studies provide important evidence on image Schemas in everyday thought and linguistic understanding, the question remains äs to whether there exists independent empirical evidence on the psychological reality of image Schemas. Our aim in this paper is to describe some of the Undings from psycholinguistics, cognitive psychology, and developmental psychology that, in our view, support the claims of cognitive semantics about image Schemas and their transformations. There are two important reasons for considering this psychological evidence. First, cognitive linguists, following the cognitive commitment to construct theories that are consistent with what is known about the mind and brain (Lakoff 1990, 1993), should be aware of the experimental fmdings from neighboring disciplines, especially data that bear on the possible connections between perception, thought, and language. Second, psychologists are sometimes skeptical about theoretical notions from linguistics that are primarily based on an individual analyst's intuitions about linguistic structure and behavior. One of the main reasons for conducting experiments with large groups of people is to minimize the uncertainty in making inferences about thought and behavior in whole populations of people. We do not entirely agree with the skepticism of psychologists about the theoretical Claims of cognitive linguists (e.g., Kennedy and Vervaeke 1993). Yet we think there exist different kinds of empirical evidence from psychology that both psychologists and cognitive linguists should be aware of regarding the importance of image Schemas in ordinary cognitive Psychology of Image Schemas 349 functioning. This paper describes some of this evidence. We begin by first elaborating the notion of image Schemas and how they are transformed. We then review work from psycholinguistics that has explicitly examined how image Schemas motivate people's understanding of word meaning. The next section of the paper describes work from cognitive psychology that seems quite consistent with Claims for the importance of image Schemas in everyday cognition. We then review work from developmental psychology that also supports the cognitive reality of image Schemas. The final section discusses the significance of the different work from psychology for future studies in cognitive linguistics. Image Schemas and their transformations Image Schemas can generally be defined äs dynamic analog representations of spatial relations and movements in space. Even though image Schemas are derived from perceptual and motor processes, they are not themselves sensorimotor processes. Instead, image Schemas are "primary means by which we construct or constitute order and are not mere passive receptacles into which experience is poured" (Johnson 1987: 30). In this way, image Schemas are different from the notion of Schemata traditionally used in cognitive science, which are abstract conceptual and propositional event structures (see Rumelhart 1980). By contrast, image Schemas are imaginative and nonpropositional in nature and operate äs organizing structures of experience at the level of bodily perception and movement. Image Schemas exist across all perceptual modalities, something that must hold for there to be any sensorimotor coordination in our experience. As such, image Schemas are at once visual, auditory, kinesthetic, and tactile. We can illustrate what is meant by the notion of image Schema, and how its internal structure is projected onto new domain via metaphor, by considering the BALANCE Schema (Johnson 1987). The idea of balance is something that is learned "with our bodies and not by grasping a set of rules" (Johnson, 1987: 74). Balancing is such a pervasive part of our bodily experience that we are seldom aware of its presence in everyday life. We come to know the meaning of balance through the closely related experiences of bodily equilibrium or loss of equilibrium. For example, a baby Stands, wobbles, and drops to the floor. It tries again and again, äs it learns how to maintain a balanced erect posture. A young boy struggles to stay up on a two-wheeled bicycle äs he learns to keep bis balance while riding down the street. Bach of us has experienced occasions when we have too much acid in our stomachs, when our hands get cold, our heads feel too hot, our bladders feel distended, our sinuses become swollen, and our mouths feel dry. In these and numerous other ways we 350 K W. Gibbs, Jr. and H. L. Colston learn the meanings of lack of balance or equilibrium. We respond to imbalance and disequilibrium by warming our hands, giving moisture to our mouths, draining our bladders, and so forth until we feel balanced once again. Our BALANCE image Schema emerges, then, through our experiences of bodily equilibriums and disequilibriums and of maintaining our bodily Systems and functions in states of equilibrium. We refer to these recurring bodily experiences äs image Schemas to emphasize means of structuring particular experiences schematically so that we can give order and connectedness to our perceptions and conceptions (Johnson 1987). One of the most interesting things about image Schemas is that they motivate important aspects of how we think, reason, and ünagine. The same image Schema can be instantiated in many different kinds of domains because the internal structure of a single Schema can be metaphorically understood. Our BALANCE image Schema, to continue with this example, is metaphorically elaborated in a large number of abstract domains of experience (e.g., psychological states, legal relationships, formal Systems) (Johnson 1991). In the cases of bodily and visual balance, there seems to be one basic scheme consisting of a point or axis around which forces and weights must be distributed so that they counteract or balance off one another. Our experience of bodily balance and the perception of balance is connected to our understanding of balanced personalities, balanced views, balanced Systems, balanced equilibrium, the balance of power, the balance of justice, and so on. In each of these examples, the mental or the abstract concept of balance is understood and experienced in terms of our physical understanding of balance. Image Schemas have internal logic or structure that determine the roles these Schemas can play in structuring various concepts and in patterns of reasoning. It is not the case that a large number of unrelated concepts (for the systematic, psychological, moral, legal, and mathematical domains) all just happen to make use of the same word balance and related terms (Johnson 1991). Rather, we use the same word for all these domains because they are structurally r