• Corpus ID: 251253068

The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives

  title={The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives},
  author={Achille Basile and K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao and Surekha Rao},
We consider classes of non-manipulable two-valued social choice functions, i.e., social choice functions with range of cardinality two within a larger set of alternatives. Corresponding to the different classes, the functional forms are described. Further we show that they, and some others from previous literature, can all be unified using a common structure. Such a structure relies on the concept of character function we introduce. This is a function from the domain of the admissible profiles… 



Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results

The functional form of all rules satisfying group strategy-proofness are obtained, in terms of two types of basic properties.

Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees

In this chapter we adopt the axiomatic approach in order to find (new) voting procedures to committees that are immune against deviations by coalitions of voters. We shall now describe our approach.