The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives
@inproceedings{Basile2022TheCO, title={The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives}, author={Achille Basile and K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao and Surekha Rao}, year={2022} }
We consider classes of non-manipulable two-valued social choice functions, i.e., social choice functions with range of cardinality two within a larger set of alternatives. Corresponding to the different classes, the functional forms are described. Further we show that they, and some others from previous literature, can all be unified using a common structure. Such a structure relies on the concept of character function we introduce. This is a function from the domain of the admissible profiles…
References
SHOWING 1-9 OF 9 REFERENCES
Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
- EconomicsInt. J. Game Theory
- 2012
The functional form of all rules satisfying group strategy-proofness are obtained, in terms of two types of basic properties.
Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof
- MathematicsMath. Soc. Sci.
- 2022
Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees
- Mathematics
- 1984
In this chapter we adopt the axiomatic approach in order to find (new) voting procedures to committees that are immune against deviations by coalitions of voters. We shall now describe our approach.…
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?
- EconomicsJ. Econ. Theory
- 2010