• Corpus ID: 235265975

The causal effect of political power on the provision of public education: Evidence from a weighted voting system

  title={The causal effect of political power on the provision of public education: Evidence from a weighted voting system},
  author={Lindgren Erik and Per Pettersson-Lidbom and Bj{\"o}rn Tyrefors},
In this paper, we estimate the causal effect of political power on the provision of public education. We use data from a historical nondemocratic society with a weighted voting system where eligible voters received votes in proportion to their taxable income and without any limit on the maximum of votes, i.e., the political system used in Swedish local governments during the period 1862-1909. We use a novel identification strategy where we combine two different identification strategies, i.e… 

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