The case for motivated reasoning.

  title={The case for motivated reasoning.},
  author={Ziva Kunda},
  journal={Psychological bulletin},
  volume={108 3},
  • Z. Kunda
  • Published 1 November 1990
  • Psychology, Medicine
  • Psychological bulletin
It is proposed that motivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes--that is, strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs. The motivation to be accurate enhances use of those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate, whereas the motivation to arrive at particular conclusions enhances use of those that are considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion. There is considerable evidence that people are more likely… Expand

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