The bargaining power of commitment: An experiment of the effects of threats in the sequential hawk–dove game

  title={The bargaining power of commitment: An experiment of the effects of threats in the sequential hawk–dove game},
  author={Luis A. Palacio Garcia and Alexandra Cort{\'e}s Aguilar and Manuel Mu{\~n}oz-Herrera},
  journal={Rationality and Society},
  pages={283 - 308}
This article studies experimentally the conditions that improve bargaining power by means of threats. The analysis centers on three essential elements of the commitment: the possibility of announcing one’s actions, the credibility of these messages, and the experience acquired in the negotiation process. For this, we chose the sequential hawk–dove game due to the fact that it is a negotiation environment with a non-equitable distribution of payoffs in equilibrium. The empirical evidence of our… 

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