The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure

  title={The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure},
  author={P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Gerard van der Laan and Dolf Talman and Zaifu Yang},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are able to cooperate only if they can form a network in the graph. A single-valued solution, the average tree solution, is proposed for this class of games. Given the graph structure we define a collection of spanning trees, where each spanning tree specifies a particular way by which players communicate and determines a payoff vector of marginal contributions of all the players… CONTINUE READING
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