The availability heuristic revisited: Ease of recall and content of recall as distinct sources of information.

  title={The availability heuristic revisited: Ease of recall and content of recall as distinct sources of information.},
  author={Norbert Schwarz and Leigh Ann Vaughn},
According to Tversky and Kahneman's (1973, p. 208) availability heuristic, individuals estimate the frequency of an event or the likelihood of its occurrence “by the ease with which instances or associations come to mind.” Although this heuristic has stimulated an enormous amount of research (see Sherman & Corty, 1984; Taylor, 1982, for reviews), the classic studies on the issue are ambiguous with regard to the underlying process. For example, in one of the better known studies, Tversky and… 

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