• Corpus ID: 55541383

The analog/digital distinction in the philosophy of mind

  title={The analog/digital distinction in the philosophy of mind},
  author={Ellie Epp},
The computer metaphor of mind has been developed in an era when the serial digital computer is in ascendancy, and those classical cognitivists who support a notion of strong equivalence between mental and computational processes have had a von Neumann architecture in mind. Analog computers have offered an alternative picture of computation, and von Neumann's The Computer and the Brain, published in 1958, brought this sense of an alternative into the philosophy of mind by suggesting that human… 


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