The agency problem between the owner and the manager in real investment: The bonus-audit relationship

@article{Nishihara2008TheAP,
  title={The agency problem between the owner and the manager in real investment: The bonus-audit relationship},
  author={Michi Nishihara and Takashi Shibata},
  journal={Oper. Res. Lett.},
  year={2008},
  volume={36},
  pages={291-296}
}
This paper derives the owner’s optimal contract with a bonus-incentive and audit when the owner delegates the investment timing decision to a manager with private information on an investment project. The optimal solution not only unifies the previous studies, but also accounts for actual auditing systems in firms. c © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 

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