The Welfare Effects of Congestion in Uncoordinated Assignment : Evidence from the NYC HS Match ∗

@inproceedings{Abdulkadiroglu2014TheWE,
  title={The Welfare Effects of Congestion in Uncoordinated Assignment : Evidence from the NYC HS Match ∗},
  author={Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Nikhil Agarwal and Parag A. Pathak},
  year={2014}
}
Centralized and coordinated school assignment systems are a growing part of recent education reforms. This paper estimates school demand using student rank order lists submitted in New York City’s high school assignment system launched in Fall 2003 to study the effects of coordinating admissions in a single-offer mechanism based on the deferred acceptance algorithm. In the previous mechanism, students were allowed to rank five choices and admissions offers were not coordinated across schools… CONTINUE READING
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