The Welfare Consequences of Strategic Voting in Two Commonly Used Parliamentary Agendas

@article{Lehtinen2007TheWC,
  title={The Welfare Consequences of Strategic Voting in Two Commonly Used Parliamentary Agendas},
  author={Aki Lehtinen},
  journal={Theory and Decision},
  year={2007},
  volume={63},
  pages={1-40}
}
  • Aki Lehtinen
  • Published 17 April 2007
  • Economics
  • Theory and Decision
This paper studies the welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas by comparing the average utilities obtained in simulated voting under two behavioural assumptions: expected utility maximising behaviour and sincere behaviour. The average utility obtained in simulations is higher with expected utility maximising behaviour than with sincere voting behaviour under a broad range of assumptions. Strategic voting increases welfare particularly if the… 

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