The Welfare Consequences of Strategic Voting in Two Commonly Used Parliamentary Agendas

@article{Lehtinen2007TheWC,
  title={The Welfare Consequences of Strategic Voting in Two Commonly Used Parliamentary Agendas},
  author={Aki Lehtinen},
  journal={Theory and Decision},
  year={2007},
  volume={63},
  pages={1-40}
}
This paper studies the welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas by comparing the average utilities obtained in simulated voting under two behavioural assumptions: expected utility maximising behaviour and sincere behaviour. The average utility obtained in simulations is higher with expected utility maximising behaviour than with sincere voting behaviour under a broad range of assumptions. Strategic voting increases welfare particularly if the… Expand
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