The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies

  title={The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies},
  author={John D. Huber},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  • John D. Huber
  • Published 1 June 1996
  • Political Science, Economics
  • American Political Science Review
I present a formal model of the confidence vote procedure, an institutional arrangement that permits a prime minister to attach the fate of a particular policy to a vote on government survival. The analysis indicates that confidence vote procedures make it possible for prime ministers to exercise significant control over the nature of policy outcomes, even when these procedures are not actually invoked. Neither cabinet ministers, through their authority over specific portfolios, nor members of… 

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