• Corpus ID: 14594925

The Very Repugnant Conclusion

@inproceedings{Arrhenius2003TheVR,
  title={The Very Repugnant Conclusion},
  author={Gustaf Arrhenius},
  year={2003}
}
Population axiology concerns how to evaluate populations in regard to their goodness, that is, how to order populations by the relations “is better than” and “is as good as”. This field has been riddled with “paradoxes” which seem to show that our considered beliefs are inconsistent in cases where the number of people and their welfare varies. Already in Derek Parfit’s seminal contribution to the topic, an informal paradox — the Mere Addition Paradox — was presented and later contributions have… 

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