Corpus ID: 54822840

The Value of a Rolodex: CEO Pay and Personal Network

  title={The Value of a Rolodex: CEO Pay and Personal Network},
  author={Paul Gao and Engelberg Joey and Parsons Chris},
  journal={Review of Financial Studies},
Whom a CEO knows has a substantial impact on pay. An additional connection to an executive or director outside the firm increases a CEO‟s compensation by over $17,000 on average, and explains about 10% of total pay. An additional premium is associated with “important” members: insiders at other firms, geographically local connections, or those within the same industry. Needy firms – those whose non-CEO executives are poorly connected and those geographically isolated from industry peers pay the… Expand

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