The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling

  title={The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling},
  author={Yiannis Giannakopoulos and Maria Kyropoulou},
  journal={ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)},
  pages={1 - 16}
  • Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou
  • Published 2017
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)
  • We study the problem of scheduling m tasks to n selfish, unrelated machines in order to minimize the makespan, in which the execution times are independent random variables, identical across machines. We show that the VCG mechanism, which myopically allocates each task to its best machine, achieves an approximation ratio of O(ln n ln / ln n). This improves significantly on the previously best known bound of O(m/n) for prior-independent mechanisms, given by Chawla et al. [7] under the additional… CONTINUE READING

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