The US financial crisis : lessons for theories of institutional complementarity

@inproceedings{Campbell2011TheUF,
  title={The US financial crisis : lessons for theories of institutional complementarity},
  author={John L. Campbell},
  year={2011}
}
Many comparative political economists hold that market performance depends on the presence of institutional complementarities. Some argue that when institutions reinforce similar incentives markets work best. Others disagree and argue that for markets to function well institutions must compensate for each other’s shortcomings rather than reinforce each other’s incentives. This paper uses evidence from the US financial crisis of 2008 to adjudicate this debate. It argues that different types of… CONTINUE READING

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