The Two-sided Effect of Elections on Coup Attempts

  title={The Two-sided Effect of Elections on Coup Attempts},
  author={Suthan Krishnarajan and Lasse Lykke R{\o}rb{\ae}k},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={1279 - 1306}
In this article, we investigate the relationship between elections and coup attempts. We argue that elections have opposing effects on the risk of coup attempts, depending on the state of the economy in which they are held. Elections occurring in conditions of economic crisis spur anti-government mobilization and high levels of state repression. This increases the subsequent risk of coup attempts. Conversely, elections held during economic expansion induce pro-government mobilization and waning… 
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