The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China's Great Leap Famine

@article{Chen2011TheTO,
  title={The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China's Great Leap Famine},
  author={Shuo Chen and James Kai-sing Kung},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  year={2011},
  volume={105},
  pages={27 - 45}
}
  • Shuo Chen, J. Kung
  • Published 8 July 2010
  • Political Science, Economics
  • American Political Science Review
A salient feature of China's Great Leap Famine is that political radicalism varied enormously across provinces. Using excessive grain procurement as a pertinent measure, we find that such variations were patterned systematically on the political career incentives of Communist Party officials rather than the conventionally assumed ideology or personal idiosyncrasies. Political rank alone can explain 16.83% of the excess death rate: the excess procurement ratio of provinces governed by alternate… Expand
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