The Timing of Endogenous Wage Setting under Bertrand Competition in a Unionized Mixed Duopoly

@inproceedings{Choi2010TheTO,
  title={The Timing of Endogenous Wage Setting under Bertrand Competition in a Unionized Mixed Duopoly},
  author={Kangsik Choi},
  year={2010}
}
The paper examines the timing of endogenous wage setting under Bertrand competition in a unionized mixed duopoly. The results are that when the public firm chooses the timing of wage setting: (1) sequential wage setting is the outcome and (2) simultaneous wage setting is the outcome. The first result coincides with the choices of the private firm, its union, and the union of the public firm if imperfect substitutability is sufficiently large. This result is in contrast to the findings of prior… CONTINUE READING

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