The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation

  title={The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation},
  author={R. Harrison Wagner},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={330 - 346}
  • R. Wagner
  • Published 1 June 1983
  • Political Science
  • American Political Science Review
The Prisoner's Dilemma game, Rousseau's image of the Stag Hunt, and the concept of a security dilemma have all been used to support the argument that much international conflict is the result of anarchy at the global level rather than the aggressive intentions of governments. This article argues that the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt are usually inadequate models of the problem they have been used to illuminate, and that a security dilemma as commonly defined need not have the… 
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