The Strategy of Conflict.

@article{Rapoport1960TheSO,
  title={The Strategy of Conflict.},
  author={Anatol Rapoport and Thomas C. Schelling},
  journal={Journal of the American Statistical Association},
  year={1960},
  volume={56},
  pages={433}
}
I. Elements of a Theory of Strategy 1. The Retarded Science of International Strategy 2. An Essay on Bargaining 3. Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War II. A Reorientation of Game Theory 4. Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision 5. Enforcement, Communication, and Strategic Moves 6. Game Theory and Experimental Research III. Strategy with a Random Ingredient 7. Randomization of Promises and Threats 8. The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance IV. Surprise Attack: A Study in Mutual… 
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