The Strategy and Technology of Conflict

  title={The Strategy and Technology of Conflict},
  author={Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sj{\"o}str{\"o}m},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  pages={3186 - 3219}
Using a simple bargaining game, we investigate how strategic interactions are shaped by preferences, technology, and endowments. We study whether changes in relative military capabilities make conflicts more likely and find a nonmonotonic relationship between the cost of conflict and the probability of conflict. The game has strategic complements if the cost of conflict is small and there is a large first-mover advantage and has strategic substitutes otherwise. This characterization generates… 
Cooperating Through Leaders ⋆
We study games of conflict (among groups, or countries) where players can choose to fight or cooperate. We consider games where conflict is detrimental: the average welfare from outcomes in which
When Capabilities Backfire: How Improved Hassling Capabilities Produce Worse Outcomes
  • P. Schram
  • Political Science
    The Journal of Politics
  • 2022
I formalize interactions between an endogenously rising challenger state and a rival, defender state that can accept the challenger’s rise, go to war before the rise comes to fruition, or degrade the
Sampling Dynamics and Stable Mixing in Hawk-Dove Games
The hawk-dove game admits two types of equilibria: asymmetric pure equilibria in which players in one population play ‘hawk’ and players in the other population play ‘dove’, and a symmetric mixed
Optimal Sanctions (cid:3)
A major power imposes targeted ((cid:147)smart(cid:148)) sanctions directly on another country(cid:146)s leader (the antagonist), in addition to comprehensive sanctions such as trade embargoes. The
Hobbesian Wars and Separation of Powers ∗
To investigate the relationship between political authority and civil conflict in weakly institutionalized environments, we analyze the Markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game of contest and


Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk
We examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence when fear is a motive for conflict.We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting with those obtained in
Commitment and Conflict in Bilateral Bargaining
Building on previous work by Schelling and Crawford, we study a model of bilateral bargaining in which negotiators can make binding commitments at a low positive cost c. Most of our results concern
Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment
Abstract We study the effect of imperfect commitment in noncooperative two-person bargaining games. By establishing the reputation for being stubborn, a player sometimes commits to her initial
Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
The authors study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition, macroeconomic coordination failures, arms races, bank runs, technology adoption and diffusion,
The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict
Two decision-makers choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. The decision-making can be manipulated by "extremists" who send publicly observed cheap-talk
Bargaining and war: A review of some formal models
Would perfectly rational agents always negotiate peaceful outcomes at the bargaining table, or would they sometimes fight costly wars? The Coase theorem suggests that when rational agents negotiate
Arms Races and Negotiations
A state which does not desire an arms race may nevertheless acquire new weapons if it believes another state will acquire them. If each state assigns some arbitrarily small probability to the event
Information, Uncertainty, and War
Uncertainty about capabilities, intent, or resolve has long been linked to war. More recently, the bargaining model of war has established uncertainty, also referred to as asymmetric information, as
The Calculus of the Security Dilemma
Some scholars known as offensive realists claim that in the uncertainty of world politics, trust and cooperation between states is extremely unlikely. Others, such as defensive realists , claim that